Make Nuclear Energy Great Again

Past Administrations have not done enough to promote clean energy alternatives to fossil fuels like nuclear energy. U.S. nuclear power has long been stalled by excessive regulations and the false assumption that new laws or authorities were needed to move faster. President Trump’s January declaration of a National Energy Emergency, followed by four executive orders in May, created the strongest federal mandate for nuclear deployment in U.S. history. Together, they sent a powerful message and equipped the U.S. with every tool it needs to accelerate deployments of new reactors.

Recent news is encouraging. Bloomberg reported on October 28, 2025, that the Trump Administration will use government investment to boost the nuclear industry, reporting that “the US will be the initial buyer for multiple reactors from Westinghouse.” This support will help to jumpstart project development and allows for components with long lead times to be ordered.

What was missing before this recent development was not authority, but execution. A presidentially declared emergency doesn’t create new authorities or suspend existing laws, but it does unlock the ability for agencies to leverage over a hundred additional statutory powers delegated by Congress. By aligning emergency authorities and nuclear-specific directives with existing powers under the Atomic Energy Act, the Defense Production Act, and existing federal siting and contracting levers, the administration has the authority today to move fast and decisively to deploy proven advanced technologies (such as the Westinghouse AP1000) without compromising safety. The administration has signaled support for removing regulatory barriers and empowering the market to drive nuclear deployment. This approach represents meaningful progress from past decades of overregulation. But it's not enough.

Our competitors aren’t waiting for markets to decide. The current market-based, state-by-state approach ignores the harsh reality: China is executing a centralized industrial strategy at breathtaking speed. After acquiring AP1000 technology through a tech transfer agreement, Beijing rapidly developed a domestic variant, the CAP1000, and is now standardizing production and construction across an entire supply chain. The New York Times reported on October 22, 2025, that China can now build a CAP1000 in 5-6 years, thanks to repetitive builds and centralized command of their supply chain. The administration should embrace what China already understands: that energy dominance and technological leadership require industrial policy, not just deregulation.

The administration should start by authorizing a national security reactor using existing law. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) § 91(b) (42 U.S.C. § 2121(b)) empowers the President to direct the Department of Energy to authorize the Department of War to manufacture, produce, or acquire a nuclear utilization facility for military purposes. This Cold War–era authority remains available today and provides a distinct pathway for facilities that support national defense. Exercising this authority would enable the Departments of Energy and War to pursue a federally owned reactor within existing statutory frameworks and accelerate progress while strengthening our competitive position in advanced nuclear deployment.

A second step would be to coordinate federal power purchase agreements. The federal government already spends billions annually on electricity procurement. By aggregating demand across agencies into a coordinated multi-agency offtake framework, the federal government can de-risk new nuclear projects with long-term, creditworthy cash flows. The General Service Administration’s (GSA) 10-year, $840M contract with Constellation for nuclear power shows the scale is achievable and demonstrates that large-scale baseload procurement is both legal and commercially bankable. By standardizing procurement terms across agencies and creating a joint framework without impacting individual budgets or authorities, the federal government can act as a catalytic buyer. Private developers get bankable revenue; federal agencies get secure, zero-carbon power at scale.

A third pillar of this approach is federal financing. The Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) can issue loan guarantees and direct loans for nuclear and other energy projects. Under this framework, LPO can design new solicitations or supplemental terms to address market barriers for first-of-a-kind deployments without requiring new legislation. With the Administration’s 2025 “Energy Dominance Financing” (EDF) initiative expanding national security-related financing tools across DOE and DOW, nuclear projects remain squarely eligible. Furthermore, the administration should utilize Defense Production Act (DPA) authorities to fund domestic expansion of the nuclear supply chain beyond fuel, prioritize federal orders, and establish public-private partnerships to underpin rapid deployments.

Finally, the Administration needs to create a Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy regulatory sandbox. This would be a time-boxed, scoped environment where NRC and DOE pilot tailored process improvements, such as alternative procedural orders, accelerated review timelines, and enhanced data sharing, for a limited number of reactors on federal land. This is not deregulation and doesn’t waive NRC’s safety or statutory obligations. Instead, it allows industry and regulators to jointly test streamlined processes under controlled, lawful conditions.

Removing barriers to let the market work is a valuable principle, but it’s insufficient when facing a strategic competitor executing a centralized plan to dominate. The question isn't whether the federal government should play a role, it's whether that role will be facilitation or leadership. If the administration wants to make nuclear energy great again, it must move beyond deregulation to deployment with the speed, scale, and strategic coordination that only centralized industrial policy can provide. China isn't waiting for perfect market conditions. Neither should we.